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ABSTRACT
In the manufacturing sector of the U.S. economy, nearly 9% of output is not accounted for as
payments to either physical capital or labor. The value of this output is a little larger than the value of the
stock of physical capital. We build a model to measure how much of this output can be attributed to
payments to organization capital-organization-specific knowledge that is built up with experience. We
find that roughly 4% of output can be accounted for as payments to organization capital and that this
capital has roughly two-thirds the value of the stock of physical capital.
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andy@atkeson.netIn the U.S. national income and product accounts (NIPA), output is accounted for as
payments to labor and payments to owners of ﬁrms. In the standard growth model, output
is accounted for as payments to labor and to physical capital. Using this growth model to
analyze NIPA data on the U.S. manufacturing sector during 1959—99, we ﬁnd that nearly 9%
of the output of this sector is not accounted for by payments to either of these factors. We
interpret this unaccounted-for output as payments to various forms of unmeasured capital or
monopoly rents. The discounted present value of this unaccounted-for output is about 120%
of the value of the stock of physical capital. In this paper, we build a model of one type of
unmeasured capital in organizations and measure the portion of unaccounted-for output that
can be accounted for as payments to this form of capital.
The type of capital that we attempt to measure is one which has long been considered
signiﬁcant. At least as far back as Marshall (1930, Book iv, Chap. 13.I), economists have
argued that organizations store and accumulate knowledge that aﬀects their technology of
production. This accumulated knowledge is a type of unmeasured capital that is distinct
from the concepts of physical or human capital in the standard growth model. Following
Prescott and Visscher (1980), we call this knowledge organization capital.
We ﬁnd that 4% of output in the U.S. manufacturing sector can be accounted for as
payments to organization capital. Thus, a little less than half of the nearly 9% unaccounted-
for output in manufacturing can be accounted for as payments to organization capital. In
the model, the discounted present value of payments to organization capital is 66%,o ra b o u t
two-thirds, of the value of physical capital.
Our model of organization capital builds on the industry evolution models of Jovanovic
(1982), Nelson and Winter (1982), and Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). We model theaccumulation of organization capital at the plant level. Each plant is distinguished by its
speciﬁc productivity and its age, and this pair of distinguishing features is what we consider
the plant’s organization capital. The speciﬁc productivity of a plant depends on the vintage
of the plant’s technology and its built-up stock of knowledge on how to use that technology.
When new plants are built, their blueprints embody the best available, or frontier, technology,
but they have little built-up knowledge. As a plant operates over time, speciﬁc productivity
grows stochastically at a rate that depends on its age. We interpret this growth of a plant’s
speciﬁc productivity as arising from a stochastic learning process.
To quantify the learning process in our model, we rely on the simple observation that
the relative size of plants in the model is determined by their relative speciﬁc productivities.
We calibrate the stochastic process by which plant productivity grows so that the model can
reproduce panel data on employment, job creation, and job destruction in manufacturing
plants of diﬀerent ages in the U.S. economy. When interpreted in the context of our model,
these data on industry evolution indicate that learning is both prolonged and substantial.
In the data, as a cohort of plants ages from newborn to 20 years old, its share of the labor
force grows by a factor of about seven. In our model, these data imply that the aggregate
of speciﬁc productivities across a cohort of plants grows substantially for 20 years. More
generally, our model replicates the patterns of plant birth, growth, and death in the U.S.
economy and, hence, quantiﬁes the accumulation of organization capital in this economy.
In terms of the literature, two broad themes have emerged since Marshall’s (1930)
work. One theme is that organization capital is embodied in the ﬁrm’s workers or in their
matches to tasks within the ﬁrm. Jovanovic (1979), Prescott and Visscher (1980), Becker
(1993), and others have developed explicit microeconomic models of this idea. Jovanovic and
2Moﬃt (1990), Topel (1991), and others have measured diﬀerent aspects of this ﬁrm-speciﬁc
human capital. Another theme in the literature is that organization capital is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc
capital good jointly produced with output and embodied in the organization itself. Arrow
(1962), Rosen (1972), Ericson and Pakes (1995), and many others have developed models
in which organization capital is acquired by endogenous learning-by-doing. We follow this
second theme and regard organization capital as embodied in the organization and as being
jointly produced with measured output.
We model speciﬁc productivity as an exogenous stochastic process in a manner similar
to that of Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). Our approach diﬀers from that of a large litera-
ture which models speciﬁc productivity as endogenous. The main advantage of our approach
is that it allows us to match the process for speciﬁc productivity directly to data on the
growth process of plants. Moreover, we need not take a stand on whether this productivity
is derived from active or passive learning, matching, or ongoing adoption of new technologies
in existing plants.
The economy considered here is a steady state version of the one in our earlier work,
Atkeson and Kehoe (2001), which we used to study the transition of the U.S. economy
following the Second Industrial Revolution. Here we use this model to measure the value of
organization capital in the U.S. economy.
1. The value of unaccounted-for output in U.S. manufacturing
Here we analyze data on the U.S. manufacturing sector during 1959—99. We ask what
fraction of output cannot be accounted for by payments to labor and physical capital. This
unaccounted-for output must be payments to owners of ﬁr m sa sc o r p o r a t ep r o ﬁts, proprietor’s
3income, or net interest that cannot be accounted for as payments to physical capital.
We ﬁnd that roughly 9% of U.S. manufacturing output is unaccounted for.1 The value
of this unaccounted-for output is about 120% of the value of the physical capital stock in this
sector. We think of this unaccounted-for output as payments to various forms of unmeasured
capital, including monopoly rents.
We arrive at this conclusion by measuring payments to labor and to physical capital
during 1959—99 as a share of output. The payments to labor can be obtained from the NIPA
(U.S. Commerce, various dates).2 On average during the 1959—99 period, these payments are
72.9% of the gross output of this sector. To measure the payments to physical capital, we
use a growth model with equipment and structures. We ﬁnd that, on average, the payments
to physical capital are 18.4% of the output of this sector. Thus, 8.7% of the output of this
sector (or roughly 9%) is not accounted for by payments to either labor or physical capital.
We interpret this unaccounted-for output as a net ﬂow of payments to the owners
of the manufacturing sector. Thus, to the extent that these are payments to unmeasured
capital, these payments are net of the costs of investing in that capital. One way to gain
some perspective on the magnitude of this ﬂow is to compare it to the ﬂow of returns that the
owners of physical capital receive net of the cost of investing in new capital. Since investment
in physical capital has averaged 11.0% of output in manufacturing, these returns are 7.4%
(= 18.4 − 11.0) of the output of this sector. Since the value of either type of capital is the
present value of their ﬂows, we conclude that the value of the claim to unaccounted-for output
in this sector is 119% (∼ = 8.7/7.4) of the value of the stock of physical capital in this sector.
We measure the payments to physical capital as follows. In a growth model with
equipment and structures, the payments to physical capital are given by rEkE +rSkS,w h e r e
4rE and rS are the rental rates and kE and kS are the stocks of the two types of capital. In the
U.S. data, the value of each stock of capital is recorded, but the rental rates are not. Thus,
to measure the portion of output that can be accounted for as payments to physical capital,
we must measure these rental rates indirectly.
To do so, let i denote the rate of return on ﬁnancial assets, namely, the return to the
portfolio of ﬁnancial claims on ﬁrms. In the model, this return is equal to the return from
buying one unit of capital of either type in period t after corporate income taxes and changes
in the relative price of that type of capital are taken into account. Thus, equating these
returns gives











where rj, pj,a n dδ
j are the rental rate, price, and depreciation rate on capital of type
j = E,S and τc is the corporate income tax rate. As described below, we measure i =5 .7%,
δ
E =1 1 .1%, δ
S =3 .0%,p E
t+1/pE
t =9 8 .3%,p S
t+1/pS
t = 101%, and τc =3 0 .5%.F r o m ( 1 ) ,
these ﬁgures imply rental rates of rE =2 2 .0% and rS =9 .9%, which together with measured
physical capital/output ratios of kE/y =6 2 .9% and kS/y =4 5 .5% imply capital shares of
rEkE/y =1 3 .9% and rSkS/y =4 .5%, for a total capital share of 18.4%.
To measure the return on ﬁnancial assets i, we compute the average return to the
portfolio of ﬁnancial claims on the nonﬁnancial corporate business sector. This return is a
weighted average of returns on equity, long-term corporate debt, and short-term debt, where
the weights are determined by the weights of these categories in the total value of claims on
that sector. We obtain values for real asset returns from Ibbotson Associates (2000). Since
real asset returns are volatile, we use the longest consistent time series available to compute
5their average returns and, hence, take averages over the period 1926—99. These averages
are 7.94% for equity (the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock price index), 2.46% for long-term
corporate bonds, and .7% for short-term debt (30-day U.S. Treasury bills). We obtain the
weights for the categories by taking average shares over the period 1959—99 from the Federal
Reserve System’s U.S. ﬂow of funds accounts (FR Board, various dates, Table L102). For
weights for equity returns, long-term bond returns, and short-term debt returns, we use the
average of the weights in the total market value of the three items: equities (line 41), 63%;
securities and mortgages (line 42), 22%; and loans and short-term paper (line 43), 15%.
We measure the depreciation rates as the ratio of the depreciation to the current cost
of capital reported by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (Herman 2000). We measure
the prices of equipment and structures as the implicit price deﬂators (from Table 7.1 of the
NIPA). We measure the corporate tax rates τc as the average of the ratio of corporate proﬁts
tax payments for the nonﬁnancial corporate business sector to the sum of corporate proﬁts
and net interest for that sector (using Table 1.16 of the NIPA).
Our estimate for the share of output unaccounted for clearly depends on the return
on ﬁnancial assets i. We measure that return as i =5 .7%. In Figure 1, we plot the share of
output paid to physical capital and the share of output unaccounted for against the return on
ﬁnancial assets i. For example, if i were 4%, then the share of output paid to physical capital
would be 15.7% and the share of output unaccounted for would be 11.4%, while if i were
8.0%, the physical capital share would be 21.9% and the share of unaccounted-for output
would be 5.1%. The share of unaccounted-for output would be zero only if the interest rate
were 11.25%. In Figure 2, we plot the corresponding ratio of the value of unaccounted-for
output relative to the value of physical capital against the return on ﬁnancial assets. When
6i is 4%, this ratio is 247%;w h e ni is 8%,t h er a t i oi s47%;a n dw h e ni is 11.25%,i ti sz e r o .
The share of output unaccounted for is much higher in the manufacturing sector than
in the nonﬁnancial corporate sector as a whole. For the larger sector, the share of payments
to labor is 72.5% while, based on the same methodology as above with i =5 .7%, the share
of payments to physical capital is 24.8%. This leaves only 2.7% of output not accounted
for instead of 8.7%. The major reason for this diﬀerence between the two sectors is that
the capital/output ratio is much higher in the nonﬁnancial corporate sector than it is in
manufacturing (1.64 vs. 1.08). In the nonﬁnancial corporate sector, the investment/output
ratio has averaged 15.2%; thus, the value of a claim to unaccounted-for output relative to the
value of the stock of physical capital is only 28%. (Larkins 2000 performs a similar calculation
of factor payments for all domestic nonﬁnancial corporations and arrives at similar numbers.)
2. A model of organization capital
In this section, we develop our quantitative model of organization capital. In the
model, time is discrete and is denoted by periods t =0 ,1,..., . The economy has two
types of agents: workers and managers. There exist a continuum of size 1 of workers and a
continuum of size 1 of managers.
Workers are each endowed with one unit of labor per period, which they supply in-
elastically. Workers are also endowed with the initial stock of physical capital and ownership
of the plants that exist in period 0. Workers have preferences over consumption given by
P∞
t=0 β
t log(cwt),w h e r eβ is the discount factor. Given sequences of wages and intertemporal
prices {wt,p t}
∞
t=0, initial capital holdings k0, and an initial value a0 of the plants that exist
in period 0, workers choose sequences of consumption {cwt}
∞







ptwt + k0 + a0. (2)
Managers are endowed with one unit of managerial time in each period. Managers have
preferences over consumption given by
P∞
t=0 β
t log(cmt). Given sequences of managerial wages
and intertemporal prices {wmt,p t}
∞
t=0, managers choose consumption {cmt}
∞
t=0 to maximize




t=0 ptwmt. Notice that we have given
all the initial assets to the workers. Since worker and manager utilities are identical and
homothetic, aggregate variables do not depend on the initial allocation of assets.
Production in this economy is carried out in plants. In any period, a plant is char-
acterized by its speciﬁc productivity A and its age s. To operate, a plant uses one unit of
a manager’s time, physical capital, and (workers’) labor as variable inputs. If a plant with





where the function F is linearly homogeneous of degree 1 and the parameter ν ∈ (0,1).
The technology parameter z is common to all plants and grows at an exogenous rate. We
call z economy-wide productivity. Following Lucas (1978, p. 511), we call ν the span of
control parameter of the plant’s manager. The parameter ν may be interpreted more broadly
as determining the degree of diminishing returns at the plant level. We refer to the pair
(A,s) as the plant’s organization-speciﬁcc a p i t a l ,or simply its organization capital.T h i sp a i r
8summarizes the built-up expertise that distinguishes one organization from another.
The timing of events in period t is as follows. The decision whether to operate or not is
made at the beginning of the period. Plants that do not operate produce nothing; the organi-
zation capital in these plants is lost permanently. Plants with organization capital (A,s) that
do operate, in contrast, hire a manager, capital kt, and labor lt and produce output according
to (3). At the end of the period, operating plants draw independent innovations ² to their
speciﬁc productivity, with probabilities given by age-dependent distributions {πs}.T h u s ,a
plant with organization capital (A,s) that operates in period t has stochastic organization
capital (A²,s +1 )at the beginning of period t +1 .
Consider the process by which a new plant enters the economy. Before a new plant can
enter in period t, a manager must spend period t− 1 preparing and adopting a blueprint for
constructing the plant that determines the plant’s initial speciﬁc productivity τt.B l u e p r i n t s
adopted in period t − 1 embody the frontier of knowledge regarding the design of plants at
that point in time. This frontier technology evolves exogenously, according to the sequence
{τt}
∞
t=0. Thus, a plant built in t − 1 starts period t with initial speciﬁc productivity τt and
organization capital (A,s)=( τt,0). We refer to growth in τt as embodied technical change.
We assume that capital and labor are freely mobile across plants in each period. Thus,
for any plant that operates in period t, the decision of how much capital and labor to hire
is static. Given a rental rate for capital rt, a wage rate for labor wt, and a managerial wage








ν − rtkt(A) − wtlt(A), (5)
where kt(A) and lt(A) are the solutions to this problem. The dividend to the owner of a
plant with organization capital (A,s) in t is given by dt(A) minus the ﬁxed cost of hiring the
manager wmt. We refer to dt(A) as variable proﬁts.
The decision whether or not to operate a plant is dynamic. This decision problem is
described by the Bellman equation











Vt+1(A²,s +1 ) πs+1(d²)
and the sequences {τt,w t,r t,w mt,p t}
∞
t=0 are given. The value Vt(A,s) is the expected dis-
counted stream of returns to the owner of a plant with organization capital (A,s).T h i sv a l u e
is the maximum of the returns from closing the plant and those from operating it. The term
V c
t (A,s), the expected discounted value of operating a plant of type (A,s), consists of current
returns dt(A)−wmt and the discounted value of expected future returns Vt+1(A,s). The plant
operates only if the expected returns V c
t (A,s) from operating it are nonnegative.
The decision whether or not to hire a manager to prepare a blueprint for a new plant
is also dynamic. In period t, this decision is determined by the equation
V
0




10The value V 0
t is the expected stream of returns to the owner of a new plant, net of the cost
wmt of paying a manager to prepare the blueprint for the plant. Such blueprints are prepared
only if the expected returns from them, V 0
t , are nonnegative.
Let µt denote the distribution in period t of organization capital across plants that
might operate in that period, where µt(A,s) is the measure of plants of age s with productivity
less than or equal to A.L e tφt ≥ 0 denote the measure of managers preparing blueprints for
new plants in t. Denote the measure of plants that operate in t by λt(A,s).T h i sm e a s u r ei s
determined by µt and the sign of the function V c





where 1V c(a,s)=1if V c
t (a,s) ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise. For each plant that operates, an
innovation to its speciﬁc productivity is drawn, and the distribution µt+1 is determined from







for s ≥ 0 and
µt+1(τt+1,0) = φt.
Let kt denote the aggregate physical capital stock. Then the resource constraints for








A lt(A)λt(dA,s)=1 . The
resource constraint for aggregate output is cwt+cmt+kt+1 = yt+(1−δ)kt, where yt is deﬁned











Managers are hired to prepare blueprints for new plants only if V 0
t ≥ 0. Since there
is free entry into the business of starting new plants, in equilibrium we require that V 0
t ≤ 0.
We summarize this condition as V 0





is the value of the workers’ initial assets.
Given a sequence of frontier blueprints and economy-wide productivities {τt,z t}, initial
endowments k0 and a0, and an initial measure µ0,a nequilibrium in this economy is a collection
of sequences of consumption; aggregate capital {cmt,c wt,k t}; allocations of capital and labor
across plants {kt(A),l t(A)}; measures of operating plants, potentially operating plants, and




; value functions and operating decisions
{dt,V t,V c
t ,V0
t }; and prices {wt,r t,w mt,p t,}, all of which satisfy the above conditions.
3. Variable proﬁts, size, and value of plants
Now we link the variable proﬁts dt(A) of a plant to the size of that plant as measured
by its employment. We will calibrate the model to match U.S. data on the pattern of plant
employment growth with age. We use this link to argue that our model will thus also match
the evolution of variable proﬁts of plants as they age. We then compute the value of these
plants by computing the present discounted value of their variable proﬁts. Finally, we show
that if we choose parameters to hold constant the model’s implications for the size of plants,
then the value of plants is invariant to the decomposition of technical change into the part
that is embodied and the part that is economy-wide.
Consider the allocation of capital and labor across plants at any point in time. Since
12capital and labor are freely mobile across plants, the problem of allocating these factors across














is the aggregate of the speciﬁc productivities. The variable nt(A) measures the size of a plant
in terms of its capital or labor or output, in that the equilibrium allocations are
kt(A)=nt(A)kt,l t(A)=nt(A)lt, and yt(A)=nt(A)yt, (12)
where yt = zt ¯ A
1−ν
t F(kt,l t)ν is aggregate output. To see this, note that since the production
function F is linear-homogeneous of degree 1 and there is only one ﬁxed factor, all operating
plants in this economy use physical capital and labor in the same proportions. The propor-
tions are those that satisfy the resource constraints for capital and labor. The variable proﬁts
for a plant with organization capital (A,s) is
dt(A)=( 1− ν)yt(A)=( 1− ν)nt(A)yt.
Variable proﬁts dt(A) minus managerial wages wmt are the proﬁts earned on organi-
zation capital. The value function Vt(A,s) is the discounted value of these proﬁts from t
13on.
The value of a plant of type (A,s) at the beginning of period t +1measured in units
of period t consumption goods is composed of two parts: the value of its physical capital and
the value of its organization capital. The value of physical capital in this plant is kt+1(A).
Likewise, the value of organization capital in this plant is pt+1Vt+1(A,s)/pt. Hence, the value























the ﬁrst term on the right side of (13) is the value of physical capital in all plants while the
second term is the value of organization capital in all plants.
Now consider our model’s implications for the size and value of plants on a steady-
state growth path. To ensure that our model has a balanced growth path, we assume that
F(k,l)=kθl1−θ.3 We deﬁne a steady-state growth path in this economy as an equilibrium in
which the quality of the best available blueprint τt and the productivity ¯ At of the average
p l a n tg r o wa tac o n s t a n tar a t e1+gτ; the economy-wide level of productivity zt grows at
a constant rate 1+gz; aggregate variables yt,c t,k t,w t,a n dwmt grow at a rate 1+g,w h e r e
1+g =[ ( 1+gz)(1+gτ)1−ν]1/(1−νθ);v a r i a b l e sφt,V0
t ,a n drt are constant; the productivity-age
distributions of plants satisfy µt+1(A,s)=µt(A/(1+gτ),s) and λt+1(A,s)=λt(A/(1+gτ),s)
14for all t,A,s;a n dVt+1(A,s)=( 1+g)Vt((A/(1+gτ),s),d t+1(A,s)=( 1+g)dt(A/(1+gτ),s),
and V c
t+1(A,s)=( 1+g)V c
t (A/(1 + gτ),s) for all t,A,s.
Note that, by deﬁnition, the size-age distribution of plants is constant along the steady-
state growth path. Now we show that data on the size-age distribution of plants do not pin
down the span of control parameter ν. Deﬁne functions W(n,s),W c(n,s), and W 0(n,s) such
that for n = A/ ¯ A0,W(n,s)=V0(n ¯ A0,s), W c(n,s)=V c
0 (n ¯ A0,s),a n dW0(n,s)=V 0
0 (n ¯ A0,s).
Let {ρs} be the cumulative distribution functions of η = ²/(1+gτ) induced by {πs}. We refer
to {ρs} as the steady-state distributions of shocks to plant size. Consider another Bellman
equation








wm0 = βW(τ0/ ¯ A0,0).
By deﬁnition of the value functions V,V c,V0 along the steady-state path, W satisﬁes this
equation. The terms in this second Bellman equation (14) have the same interpretation as
those in the ﬁrst (6), as descriptions of the returns to operating or closing a plant of size n
and age s. The function W c(n,s) deﬁnes a rule for operating plants: plants with W c(n,s) ≥ 0
operate, and those with Wc(n,s) < 0 do not.
Having replaced speciﬁc productivity with size as a state variable, we have the following
proposition:
Proposition. Consider two economies with the same steady-state growth rate g and the
15same distribution of shocks to size. Let these economies have diﬀerent rates of growth of
economy-wide and embodied technical change that satisfy







so that the two economies have the same steady-state growth rate of output g. Let the
distributions of shocks to speciﬁc productivity correspondingly diﬀer so that ²/(1 + gτ) and
²/(1+g
0
τ) have the same distribution. Then these two economies have the same steady-state
size-age distribution of plants and the same value of organization capital.
Proof. Since the economies have the same distribution of shocks to size, the decision to
operate plants of size n and age s in both economies is characterized by the solution to (14);
thus, the economies have the same steady-state size-age distribution of plants. By deﬁnition,
the value functions are the same; thus, so are the values of organization capital. Clearly, the
rest of the equilibrium prices and quantities are the same as well. q.e.d.
4. Calibration and measurement
Now we calibrate our model. We draw on aggregate data from the U.S. manufacturing
sector to determine the growth rate of output per hour g, the discount factor β, the depre-
ciation rate δ, the physical capital share νθ, and the growth rate of aggregate total factor
productivity which must be allocated between growth in the frontier technology and growth
in the economy-wide technology. We use observations from micro data on manufacturing
plants in the United States to choose the parameters aﬀecting the shocks to size.
The macro parameters are chosen to reproduce several average statistics observed in
16the data on the U.S. manufacturing sector during 1959—99, obtained from the U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce’s national income and product accounts (NIPA). To match the model to
observations, we introduce a corporate proﬁts tax τc since tax payments of this type comprise
a substantial portion of the output of the corporate sector. We assume that this tax is levied
on corporate proﬁts measured as sales less compensation of employees and the depreciation
of physical capital (yt− wtlt − wmt − δkt). We assume that these corporate tax revenues are
rebated as a lump-sum payment to workers. Accordingly, the workers’ Euler equation for









− δ)+1 . (15)
We use data from the U.S. Department of Labor (various dates) on output per hour of
all persons in manufacturing to compute the trend growth rate of output from 1959 to 1999,
which turns out to be g =2 .9%. We choose the discount factor β so that the ratio (1+g)/β
equals the average rate of return on ﬁnancial assets that we computed above to be 5.7%.
We choose the parameters of our one-sector model to equal the relevant aggregates in
the manufacturing sector: the total depreciation rate on capital in manufacturing is δ =7 .7%,
the total capital/output ratio is k/y = 116%, the physical capital share of νθ =1 8 .4%, and
the corporate proﬁts tax rate is τc =3 0 .5%.
Consider next the growth of the Solow residual. The steady-state growth rate of
output per worker, 1+g, is related to the growth of the Solow residual by (1+g)1−νθ,w h i c h
can be decomposed as (1 + g)1−νθ =( 1+gz)(1 + gτ)1−ν. Given our choices of g =2 .9%
and νθ =1 8 .4%, the growth of the Solow residual is (1 + g)1−νθ =1 .024. Since we calibrate
17our model to reproduce observations on plant size, the steady state is not aﬀected by this
decomposition of the Solow residual. For concreteness, we let all the growth come from the
growth in the frontier technology.
Now consider the span of control parameter ν. Hundreds of studies have estimated
production functions with micro data. These analyses incorporate a wide variety of assump-
tions about the form of the production technology and draw on cross-sectional, panel, and
time series data from virtually every industry and developed country. Douglas (1948) and
Walters (1963) survey many studies. More recent work along these lines has also been done
by Baily, Hulten, and Campbell (1992); Bahk and Gort (1993); and Bartelsman and Dhrymes
(1998). Atkeson, Khan, and Ohanian (1996) review this literature and present evidence, in
t h ec o n t e x to fam o d e ll i k eo u r s ,t h a tν = .85 is a reasonable value for this parameter.
In parameterizing the distributions of shocks to speciﬁc productivity, we assume that
these shocks to size have a lognormal distribution, so that log²s ∼ N(ms,σ2
s).W e c h o o s e
the means and standard deviations of these distributions to be smoothly declining functions
of s.I n p a r t i c u l a r , w e s e t ms = γ1 + γ2(S−s
S )2 for s ≤ S and ms = γ1 otherwise and
σs = γ3 +γ4(S−s
S )2 for s ≤ S and σs = γ3 otherwise. With this parameterization, the shocks
for plants of age S or older are drawn from a single distribution. Thus, shocks to plant-speciﬁc
productivity are parameterized by {γi}4
i=1 and age S.
We choose the parameters governing these shocks so that the model matches data on
the fraction of the labor force employed in plants of diﬀerent age groups, as well as data on
job creation and job destruction in plants of diﬀerent age groups, from the 1988 panel of the
U.S. Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Research Database (the LRD).4 We choose the data from
this panel because it has the most extensive breakdown of plants by age. We think of these
18statistics as analogous to choosing means and variances of shocks to productivity.
More formally, Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) deﬁne the following statistics.
Employment in a plant in year t is (lt + lt−1)/2, where lt is the labor force in year t. Job
creation in a plant in year t is lt − lt−1 if lt ≥ lt−1 and zero otherwise. Job destruction in
a plant in year t is lt−1 − lt if lt ≤ lt−1 and zero otherwise. In Figure 3, we report for each
age category these three statistics for U.S. manufacturing plants in 1988 for all plants in that
category relative to the total employment in all plants.
We set the parameter S = 100 and choose the γi to minimize the sum of the squared
errors between the statistics computed from the model and those in the data. The resulting
model statistics are also plotted in Figure 3. For completeness, note that the implied statistics
for the overall job creation and destruction rates are 8.3% and 8.4% for the data and 10.4%
and 10.4% for the model. To get a feel for how these numbers ﬂuctuate, note that in annual
data during 1972—93, the standard deviation of the job creation and job destruction rates
are 2.0 and 2.7. In Figure 4, we plot the means and standard deviations of shocks to the log
of the size of plants, ms and σs. The parameters that generate these shocks are S =1 0 0 ,
γ1 = −.1149,γ2 = .1711, γ3 = .2018, and γ4 = .0009.
5. Industry evolution in the steady state
We have calibrated our model to data on employment shares and job creation and
destruction for plants in various age groups. Here we compare the implications of our cali-
brated model to other important features of data on the birth, growth, and death of plants.
We ﬁnd that our model approximately captures most of these features. Hence, we argue that
the model replicates the basic patterns of the accumulation of organization-speciﬁc capital in
19the data.
Speciﬁcally, we compare our model to data on job destruction in failing plants, the
distribution of growth rates of capital and labor by plants, and the distribution of labor and
capital productivity in plants by size and age. We think of the data on job destruction in
failing plants as measuring the failure rate of plants, in contrast to job destruction, which is
the death rate of jobs. The data on the distribution of plant growth rates are a check on our
assumption that the shocks to size are normally distributed.
First consider plant failure rates. In Figure 5, we show job destruction in failing plants
by age group for the model and the data. For each age group, job destruction in failing plants
is the ratio of employment in plants that fail in that age group to total employment. This
ratio has the interpretation of a size-weighted failure rate of plants. Total job destruction in
plants that fail is 3.0% in the model and 2.2% in the data. In terms of the breakdown of
job destruction in plants that fail by age group, the model has substantially higher failure
rates for the youngest plants (aged 1—5 years) than the data show. We have seen in Figure
3 (bottom panel), however, that the model has about the right amount of job destruction in
plants aged 1—5. Hence, the model has too many of the young plants dying and not enough
job destruction in young plants that continue.
Next consider the distribution of plant growth rates. In Figure 6, we show the distribu-
tion of plant-level job creation and job destruction in the model and the data. In this ﬁgure,
we divide plants into ten groups, based on the plants’ growth rate of employment (measured
here by G =( lt −lt−1)/lt−1), and show the fraction of total job creation (when G is positive)
and the fraction of total job destruction (when G is negative) accounted for by plants in
each of these groups.5 For the data, we again draw on the work of Davis, Haltiwanger, and
20Schuh (1996). In their data, a substantial amount of job creation comes from continuing
plants that more than double in size (15.3%), and a substantial amount of job destruction
comes from continuing plants that more than halve in size (18.4%). In our model with nor-
mally distributed shocks to size, shocks this large are more than three standard deviations
from the mean and occur with extremely low probability. In order to match these extreme
observations, we would need fatter-tailed distributions for the shocks.
Finally, consider the distributions of labor and capital productivity across plants by
size and age. Our model predicts that at each point in time, both of these measures of
productivity are constant across plants. This implication follows immediately from our as-
sumption that the production function is Cobb-Douglas. To see this, note that (12) implies
that yt(A)/lt(A)=yt/lt and yt(A)/kt(A)=yt/kt. For the data, Bartelsman and Dhrymes
(1998) report, for a large sample of U.S. manufacturing plants drawn from the LRD, a geo-










by age group and size decile as measured by the average size of employment during 1972—86,
where the weights are obtained from a regression of outputs on inputs. In Figure 7, we report
the Bartelsman and Dhrymes values for this measure by age groups (top panel) and by size
deciles (bottom panel). Although Bartelsman and Dhrymes ﬁnd substantial variations in
average productivity across individual plants in their data, Figure 7 demonstrates that they
ﬁnd no systematic relation between the average productivity in a plant and either its age or
its size.
21Jensen, McGuckin, and Stiroh (2001) found similar results in the data. They study
labor productivity measured as value added per hour worked in a more extensive sample of
U.S. manufacturing plants, also drawn from the LRD. They note that across individual plants,
in their sample, there is extensive variation. When productivity is averaged across plants in a
cohort, however, there seems to be no systematic relationship between labor productivity and
age. Indeed, Jensen, McGuckin, and Stiroh report that after about 5—10 years, all cohorts of
surviving plants have similar productivity levels.
6. Findings
Here we report our model’s measure of the share of output that is paid to organization
capital and the value of that capital relative to the value of physical capital. We also compare
these ﬁndings to corresponding data for the U.S. manufacturing sector.
Recall that in our model, aggregate output is given by




This output is paid to four factors: physical capital, workers, managers, and organization
capital. The share of output paid to physical capital is νθ;t ow o r k e r s ,ν(1 − θ);a n dt o
managers, wm/y; and the rest is paid to organization capital. We have calibrated the physical
capital share in the model to match that in the data, so that νθ =1 8 .4%. The share of output
paid to labor is the sum of the shares paid to workers and managers. With a span of control
parameter ν = .85, the share paid to workers is ν(1 − θ)=6 6 .6%.
We use the model to compute the division of the remaining 15% of output into the share
22paid to managers and the share paid to organization capital. In the model, the managerial






In Table 1, we report these shares for the data and the model, ﬁrst with ν = .85.W i t h
our calibration, 11.0% of output is paid to managers, so that the share paid to labor is 77.6%,
and the share paid to organization capital is 4.0%. In comparison, the shares in the data are
72.9% for labor and 8.7% unaccounted for. Our model thus accounts for about 46% (4.0/8.7)
of the unaccounted-for output in manufacturing. Since the shares in our model must sum to
1, the remainder of the unaccounted-for output, 4.7% (8.7 − 4.0), must show up in another
share. Since we calibrate the model to match the physical capital share, the remainder shows
up as payments to managers and is thus added to the labor share, giving a total labor share
of 77.6% (72.9+4 .7).
In terms of values, the payments to physical capital net of investment are 6.1% of
output (=1 8 .4−12.3). Hence, the value of organization capital relative to physical capital in
the model is 66% (4.0/6.1). In the data, recall, the value of unaccounted-for output is 119%
that of physical capital.
Most of the parameters of our model are well-measured. One has greater uncertainty,
however: the span of control parameter ν. We consider the sensitivity of our ﬁndings to this
parameter.
Consider raising ν to .9 and adjusting θ so that the physical capital share νθ is un-
changed at 18.4%. With this change in the span of control parameter–the results of which
23are also shown in Table 1–the share of output paid to organization capital falls from 4.0% to
2.7%. Again, because the factor shares sum to 1, the remainder of the unaccounted-for out-
put is attributed to labor. The ratio of the value of organization capital relative to physical
capital falls from 66% to 44%.
More generally, we can show that the payments to organization capital relative to the
sum of the payments to organization capital and managers is independent of ν. To see this,
note from (6) and (7) that the value functions and managerial wages are homogeneous of
degree 1 in 1 − ν. Thus, if we have two economies with the same shocks to plant size, one
having span of control parameter ν, managerial wages wmt, and value function Vt(A,s) and
the other having span of control parameter ˜ ν, managerial wages ˜ wmt, and value functions
˜ Vt(A,s), then
˜ Vt(A,s)











Since 1 − ν is the sum of managerial wages and payments to organization capital, the result
follows.
In Table 1, we see that of the 15% share paid to organization capital and managers,
organization capital gets roughly one-quarter of the share and managers get roughly three-
quarters. Given the above result, this relation holds for all ν. Hence, for any ν, the organiza-
tion capital share is roughly (1 − ν)/4, and the managerial share is roughly 3(1 − ν)/4.
247. Conclusion
We have found that nearly half of the unaccounted-for output in the U.S. manufac-
turing sector can plausibly be attributed to organization capital and that the value of this
organization capital is roughly two-thirds of the value of the physical capital stock. This orga-
nization capital is produced as part of the turbulent and time-consuming process of building
up a stock of organization-speciﬁc knowledge in plants. Our measurement of the value of
this capital–4% of manufacturing output–is based on micro data on the birth, growth, and
d e a t ho fp l a n t s .
Still, despite our measurement of organization capital, 4.7% of output in the manu-
facturing sector remains unaccounted for. Presumably, this remainder can be attributed to
other forms of unmeasured capital and monopoly rents.
Note that for broader measures of output, like that in the nonﬁnancial corporate sector,
a much smaller fraction of output is unaccounted for. This is consistent with the idea that
knowledge built up over time in speciﬁc organizations–organization capital–is particularly
important for the manufacturing sector.
25Notes
1In measuring output, we subtract indirect business taxes from the NIPA measure of
gross output.
2We divide the 1.4% of manufacturing output that is accounted for as proprietors’
income between payments to labor and payments to owners of ﬁrms in proportion to the
division of output less proprietors’ income between labor and the owners of ﬁrms.
3This assumption of Cobb-Douglas production is necessary for a steady-state growth
path. Along such a path, ¯ A grows at constant rate 1+gτ, the capital/labor ratio k grows
at rate 1+g,a n d(1 + gτ)f((1 + g)k)=( 1+g)f(k), where f(k)=F(k,1).T h u s , f(k) is
homogeneous of degree x =1−[log(1+gτ)/log(1+g)]. Since f(λk)=λ
xf(k), f(k)=kxf(1);
so f is a power function, and thus, F is Cobb-Douglas.
4Here and throughout the paper, our microeconomic data are taken from the U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau’s 1998 Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) on U.S. manufacturing plants.
These data are broken down by crude age categories. In Figure 7, we use data from the
1988 panel of the LRD obtained from the computer disk that accompanies Davis, Halti-
wanger, and Schuh’s (1996) book; these data are also available from Haltiwanger’s Web site:
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/econ/haltiwanger/.
5For each plant, let Git =( lit−lit−1)/lit−1. Then, for example, for the category [0,10%],
the statistic plotted is
P
{i|Git∈[0,.1]} lit − lit−1
P
i max{0,l it − lit−1}
.
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29Table 1
Accounting for Output in the U.S. Manufacturing Sector
Model
U.S. Manufacturing  = .85  = .9
Shares of Output
Labor 72.9% 77.6% 78.9%
    Workers — 66.6 71.6
    Managers — 11.0 7.3
Physical Capital 18.4 18.4 18.4
Unaccounted for 8.7 — —
Organization capital — 4.0 2.7




Org. capital/Physical capital — 66 44
Investment/Output 11.0 12.3 12.3
U.S. manufacturing data described in Section 1.Figure 2
Unaccounted-For Output as a Percentage of Physical Capital
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Unaccounted-For OutputFigure 3 Employment Statistics by Manufacturing Plant Age
in the Model and in the 1988 U.S. Data
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Job Destruction in Failing Plants by Age of Plant
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Source: Bartelsman and Dhrymes 1998